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Cooperation or confrontation?  
Exploring stakeholder relationships in rural tourism land expropriation 
Abstract 
The current study explored the triadic relationship between the government, local 
residents and developers as stakeholders in rural tourism land expropriation. Unstructured 
interviews and non-participant observation were conducted to obtain relevant data. Social 
action theory was applied to delineate the complex interaction and relationships between the 
various stakeholders. Growth machine theory was also used to reveal the internal 
mechanisms of these relationships. The results showed that in land expropriation for rural 
tourism development in the case setting, stakeholders’ relationships were not merely 
cooperative or antagonistic; rather, their interests were interwoven and showed a 
process-based evolution with the progress of land expropriation. Finally, the local 
government (political elite) and the developer (economic elite) formed a growth coalition and 
jointly led the process of land expropriation. However, local residents failed to form an 
anti-growth coalition, which indicates the potential vulnerability of tourism coalition 
formation. These insights have implications for developing sustainable tourism, including 
government involvement and resident participation, particularly in the context of developing 
countries. 
Keywords: Tourism stakeholders; Social action; Growth machine; Land expropriation; Rural 
tourism 
1. Introduction 
Sustainable tourism depends on harmonious cooperation between stakeholders (Qian et 
al., 2017). Collaboration requires adequate power to convene stakeholders (Purdy, 2012). 
This is particularly true of rural tourism development. Rural tourism has been regarded as an 
essential developmental strategy in many countries (Ayhan et al., 2020), especially in 
developing countries, where tourism is regarded as an important means of poverty alleviation 
and the key to local economic development (Ying & Zhou, 2007). China is a good example 
(Su, 2011). By the end of 2018, China’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs had 
established 388 national demonstration sites for rural tourism, receiving 3 billion tourist visits 
and generating RMB800 billion in revenue (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, 2019). 
Rural tourism is booming, and the demand for tourism land is increasing. Land 
expropriation, which involves multiple stakeholders in complex relationships, is more 
common in China than land renting, which is characterised by simple bilateral stakeholder 
relationships. Local governments play a leading role in the process (Wang & Wall, 2007). 
Due to its multiple subjects and complicated procedures, land expropriation creates very 
tense relationships between stakeholders. Therefore, land expropriation was chosen as the 
research context for the current investigation. Rural land expropriation in China is distinct 
from that in the West due to its unique top-down administrative system and socialist 
dual-track land ownership system. These two unique institutional features (Cai, 2016) place 
the government in the leading position (Wang & Wall, 2007) and residents in the weak 
position (Li et al., 2016) in land expropriation. However, compared with land expropriation 
for other purposes, such as dams, public works and investment projects, land expropriation 
for tourism development is more likely to be welcomed by residents (Hernandez et al., 1996). 
Residents believe that tourism development will bring them more job opportunities, and they 
seek to participate to improve their quality of life (Cai, 2016). These expectations increase the 
complexity of stakeholder relationships and aggravate conflict between stakeholders in the 
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land expropriation process (Sargeson, 2016; Wang & Yotsumoto, 2019). Therefore, 
strengthening cooperation between different stakeholders and identifying common interests 
are key to attaining sustainable tourism development (Sautter & Leisen, 1999). 
However, little attention has been paid to the roles of different stakeholders in 
addressing sustainable tourism development (Wray, 2009), or to the interaction between 
stakeholders and the logic underlying their actions (Wearing et al., 2010; Lee & Jan, 2019). 
Given the paucity of research in this area and the importance of land expropriation to 
sustainable tourism development, this study aims to identify the different roles of 
stakeholders and determine how to promote cooperation between stakeholders in the land 
appropriation process of rural tourism (Byrd, 2007; Hardy & Beeton, 2001). Based on this, 
three key questions are asked. In the land expropriation stage of rural tourism development, 
do all key stakeholders really participate? How do stakeholders interact, and what 
relationships do they form? What logic is their actions guided by, and what is its internal 
mechanism? The study’s findings enrich research on tourism stakeholders and provide a point 
of reference and guidance for sustainable tourism development in developing countries. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Stakeholder cooperation in tourism development  
‘Stakeholders’ refers to any group or individual that can affect or be affected by the 
goals of the organisation (Freeman, 1984: p. 46). Weaver and Oppermann (2000) defined 
tourism stakeholders as comprising mainly tourists, tourism businesses, the origin 
government, the host government, host communities, non-governmental organisations and 
universities. A map of tourism stakeholders was drawn by Weaver and Oppermann (2000). 
There are different tourism stakeholders in different tourism scenarios. However, there is no 
doubt about the importance of stakeholders to current and future tourism development (Jamal 
& Getz, 1999).  
Studies have focused on analysing and categorising stakeholders (Byrd, 2007; Hardy & 
Beeton, 2001). A growing number of researchers have argued that stakeholder 
cooperation/collaboration is fundamental to sustainable tourism planning and destination 
development (Jamal & Stronza, 2009; Qian et al., 2017; Sautter & Leisen, 1999; Stoddarta et 
al., 2019; Wondirad et al., 2020). Waligo et al. (2013) discussed how relevant stakeholders 
participate in sustainable tourism and formed a multi-stakeholder involvement management 
framework. However, the nature of cooperation and why it does not occur between certain 
stakeholders have not been fully explored (Wearing et al., 2010). This study thus explores the 
specific processes of interaction and the complicated relationships between stakeholders 
during land expropriation for rural tourism development. 
2.2. Factors influencing stakeholder cooperation 
Scholars have emphasised the importance of stakeholder participation to sustainable 
tourism development and called on stakeholders to cooperate on tourism (Waligo et al., 2013). 
However, stakeholders are so diverse and heterogeneous that it is extremely difficult and 
complicated for them to participate in this process (Jamal & Getz, 1999; Waligo et al., 2013). 
Different stakeholders hold different views and positions (Markwick, 2000). Studies have 
shown that the degree of stakeholders’ participation varies according to their interests and 
level of empowerment (Panyik et al., 2011). Therefore, power and interest are important 
factors affecting the cooperation of stakeholders. 
Stakeholders in cooperation can be identified and distinguished based on their interests 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995: 67). Different subjects have different interests (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995). For example, in the process of tourism development, local governments and 
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entrepreneurs may pay particular attention to economic benefits (Dredge, 2010). For residents, 
economic benefits are most pertinent in the involvement stage (Kim et al., 2013). Local 
residents want to improve their quality of life (Brunt & Courtney, 1999). Conflicts often arise 
when different parties have incompatible interests and seek to achieve different outcomes 
(Wang & Yotsumoto, 2019). 
Power is also an important factor affecting stakeholder interaction (Jamal & Getz, 1999), 
and shapes the overall distribution of benefits (Ying & Zhou, 2007). In reality, there is always 
an imbalance of power between stakeholders (Bramwell & Sharman, 1999; Jamal & Getz, 
1999). Power often rests with an established local elite, which supersedes the salient majority 
(local residents) (Hall, 1999; Tosun, 2000). This imbalance of power leads to conflicts among 
stakeholders, especially in the tourism planning stage. As noted by Ploger (2001), planning is 
a form of discursive power. It can also be a process, during which conflicts emerge over 
power relationships that reflect the entrenchment of strong economic or social interests 
(Hanna, 2005). 
To date, although research has explored cooperation between stakeholders, it has ignored 
the interaction and relationships between stakeholders in tourism development (Lee & Jan, 
2019). Yet clarifying the specific logic of stakeholders’ interaction and action and seeking 
common interests among them are vital to promote cooperation among stakeholders and 
guide the sustainable development of rural tourism. This study focuses on identifying 
stakeholders’ different roles and finding ways to promote cooperation between them in the 
process of land appropriation for rural tourism.  
2.3. Stakeholders in land expropriation for rural tourism in China 
The main stakeholders involved in land expropriation for rural tourism in China are 
local governments, tourism developers and residents (Ma et al., 2020). Different stakeholders 
play different roles in rural tourism land expropriation. 
Local governments play the leading role in rural tourism development (Wang & Wall, 
2007). There are several reasons for this. The first is China’s characteristic socialist land 
system. Second, China has a dual-track land system. According to China’s Land 
Administration Law, states own all urban land and village collectives own all rural land, 
subject to restrictions on land use and transfer. To achieve tourism development through land 
expropriation, the government needs to expropriate land from residents and then sell the land 
use rights to the developers (Guo, 2001). In addition, China’s top-down administrative system 
requires the central government to make decisions and local governments at all levels to 
implement these decisions (Qin et al., 2011). This strengthens the local government’s 
dominant position. 
Local governments are the political subject and hold the administrative power in local 
tourism development. However, in the process of rural tourism development in China, local 
governments lack the financial support required to develop and build tourist destinations (Li 
et al., 2016; Zhou et al., 2017), including land expropriation compensation payments for 
residents and follow-up project construction funds. These are provided by tourism developers, 
which have a strong economic foundation. Tourism developers and their external capital 
provide important economic support for tourism development in backward rural areas (Li et 
al., 2016; Ying & Zhou, 2007; Zhou et al., 2017). This is significantly different from the 
responsibility relationship between the private sector and the government in Western society. 
In China, tourism developers and the government have interwoven interests (Ying & Zhou, 
2007). 
Residents are the main agents in rural tourism, and their willingness to promote and 
attitude towards promoting tourism affect the smooth development of tourism projects and 
the stable development of rural society (Ma et al., 2020). Residents’ participation in tourism 
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is an important element of sustainable tourism development (Tosun, 2000). However, 
research has shown that residents in developing countries are in a weak position in the 
decision-making stage of tourism development (Li et al., 2016). The rights of residents are 
seriously limited in the power play of stakeholders in tourism development (Wang & 
Yotsumoto, 2019; Ying & Zhou, 2007). Compensation for land under China’s planned 
economic system is much lower than the value of land in a market economy (Guo & Gao, 
2014). Land is the most important asset of the majority of rural residents, because it functions 
as both a source of income and a mechanism of social insurance (Cai, 2016). Power 
distribution plays an important and even a decisive role in community participation, and 
tourism development in rural China is a power play for benefits between the government (at 
various levels), tourism developers and local communities (Wang & Yotsumoto, 2019). 
Land expropriation, which is central to the government’s strategies for development and 
capital accumulation, has frequently encountered fierce opposition from residents and led to 
extreme social conflict (Sargeson, 2016; Wang & Yotsumoto, 2019). Therefore, 
deconstructing the logic of the interaction and relationships between and actions taken by 
different agents in the process of land expropriation for rural tourism development can help 
guide the sustainable development of rural tourism and social harmony in developing 
countries like China.  
3. Theoretical framework 
3.1. The theory of social action  
Max Weber’s social action theory is adopted to understand the process of interaction of 
individual stakeholders in land expropriation for rural tourism development. Social action has 
two key features. First, the action has a purpose, and the actor endows the action with a 
certain significance (Weber, 1978). Individuals are seen as goal-directed, guided by both their 
own interests and constraints imposed by the social environment (Coleman, 1986). Second, 
their actions are oriented by the behaviour of others, through connections between 
individuals’ behaviour in the social sphere (Banton, 2007; Weber, 1949). Following Weber’s 
logical interpretation of social action, this paper uses ‘actor-goal-action’ analysis to 
deconstruct the processes of interaction and forms of relationships between stakeholders in 
land expropriation for tourism development. In land expropriation for tourism development, 
the social actions of the actors are reflected through typical events. Therefore, the final 
framework for analysis is ‘actor-goal-action-typical events’. Social action theory is applied to 
delineate the complex interaction of and obtain detailed information on various stakeholders 
to answer the following research questions. In the land expropriation stage of rural tourism 
development, do all key stakeholders really participate? How do stakeholders interact, and 
what forms do their relationships take? 
3.2. Growth machine theory  
Molotch (1976) first proposed the concept of a ‘growth machine’. He argued that cities 
can be conceived as growth machines, and that the future use of and competition for land 
represent the political and economic essence of any locality. Follow-up studies further 
developed the growth machine thesis (Molotch & Logan, 1984; Sanders & Stone, 1987). In a 
liberal democratic society, cities have a unitary interest in growth and economic development. 
The fundamental challenge facing local governments is the conflict between public power 
and private resource ownership. Thus, coalitions often form between local governments, 
which represent the elected public authority, and business groups, which control major 
development resources, in urban governance (Stone, 1993). However, conditions affecting the 
quality of life in a community are a consequence of the social, economic, and political power 
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wielded by the growth machine. Local nested communities within the larger community tend 
to develop in reaction to the decisions made by the growth machine (Molotch, 1976; Zhang, 
2002). 
For tourism researchers, growth machine theory offers a theoretical context for 
explaining local economic growth and development through political coalitions and land use 
allocation (Harrill et al., 2011). Only a handful of tourism researchers to date have used 
growth machine theory (Green et al., 1996). Canan and Hennessy’s (1989) application of 
growth machine theory to the Hawaiian island of Moloka’i revealed an economic transition 
from agriculture to tourism, followed by land use conflict over resort development and finally 
the erosion of local culture. Madrigal (1995) noted that an internal marketing strategy should 
be conducted within a socially conscious framework that is designed to serve the needs of the 
community, not members of the growth machine. In a study of Hilton Head in South Carolina, 
USA, Martin et al. (1999) found a relatively wealthy anti-growth coalition. Harrill et al. (2011) 
used growth machine theory as a context for identifying Macao residents’ attitudes towards 
gaming and tourism development. The case of Wudaoliang shows interesting points of 
congruence with Molotch’s thesis: elites competed and sometimes aligned in land 
expropriation conflicts over rapid tourism development, with profound consequences for the 
local community’s life and interests. Growth machine theory is used as the main framework 
for analysis to reveal the logic and internal mechanisms of the actions of different 
stakeholders. The overall analysis of the formation of the Wudaoliang tourism growth 
machine is based on detailed process information on the interaction between subjects 
obtained by social action theory. With the guidance of both social action theory and growth 
machine theory, the following research question is addressed. What are the logic and internal 
mechanisms of stakeholders’ actions and interaction? 
4. Research context  
The study setting was Wudaoliang village, which is located in Laowa township, 
Luanping county, Chengde city, Hebei province. The village’s per capita annual net income is 
less than US$661. Access to the area can be difficult, because it is located in the Yanshan 
mountain range, with poor transportation links. Local residents have long faced difficulties 
associated with insufficient drinking water, high living costs and a poor quality of life. 
Nevertheless, the local government has sought to develop tourism in the village due to its 
unique topography and the presence of high-quality tourism resources such as the Great Wall 
and dinosaur egg fossils. In April 2016, the Luanping county government signed a 
cooperation agreement with Tianxing Jiuzhou Investment Co., Ltd (hereafter TXJZ), which 
decided to expropriate 110 acres of land in Wudaoliang village. According to Molotch (1976), 
developing land is the central political goal and raison d’être for local governments. In 
Wudaoliang’s case, this is certainly true: with the development of tourism, land expropriation 
conflicts have become predominant at the level of both the local government and the local 
community. 
The process of land expropriation for tourism development in Wudaoliang involved 
three main stakeholders: the local governments, a tourism developer and local residents. 
From the beginning of the cooperation negotiations, three levels of local government – 
Luanping county, Laowa township and Sandaogou village – interacted with TXJZ and local 
residents. In China, governments at different levels assume different functions (Zuo et al., 
2017). County-level governments are mainly responsible for strategic planning, attracting 
investment, rule-making and leadership coordination. Township governments are mainly 
responsible for implementing planning policies, as well as organising land expropriation and 
house relocation, selecting sites for relocation and other work. Village-level governments are 
mainly responsible for coordinating and negotiating with residents. Under China’s Organic 
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Law of Village Committees, villagers’ committees are considered not local government 
organisations, but rather grassroots democratic and self-governance organs. The relationship 
between a villagers’ committee and the township government is not that of an administrative 
superior and subordinate, i.e., leader and led; rather, it resembles the relationship between a 
guide and the guided. Villagers’ committees play a certain role in tourism development and 
the distribution of benefits. Although the members of villagers’ committees are local residents, 
however, they are different from ordinary residents, with whom their interests are often not 
consistent (Wang & Yotsumoto, 2019). In reality, village committees are often influenced by 
local governments and responsible for enforcing their will (Wang & Yotsumoto, 2019). 
Sandaogou’s village committee is no exception. Therefore, in this study, the village 
committee is called the ‘village government’. 
5. Research methods  
Compared with quantitative approaches, qualitative approaches are better suited to 
assessing the interactions between stakeholders in tourism development (Lee & Jan, 2019). 
The authors conducted field research in Wudaoliang for 88 days. Unstructured in-depth 
interviews and non-participant observation were carried out to obtain relevant behavioural 
and intentional information on each stakeholder in land expropriation for tourism 
development in Wudaoliang. Non-participant observation refers to the hidden observation 
made by researchers when they go deep into the living background of the research object 
without revealing the real identity of the researcher and participate in the daily social life of 
the research object, and the significant difference between it and participant observation lies 
in the difference of immersion (Babbic, 1992). Although we conducted field research for 88 
days in the local area, we were only observers of the land expropriation event and not the 
interest subject of this event. Therefore, we use “non-participant observation” to make the 
statement, which also used in other tourism literatures (Andriotis, 2010; Chan et al., 2016). 
Specifically, non-participant observation was used to identify the key events that change the 
relationships between stakeholders. Unstructured in-depth interviews were used to obtain 
detailed information on the intentions of the various stakeholders and the relationships 
between them. In addition, the authors collected statistics and statements on the social and 
economic development of Wudaoliang, relevant government documents, meeting minutes 
and information from other secondary sources. The secondary data provided a solid 
foundation for the presentation of the whole process of land expropriation for rural tourism, 
and complemented the primary data on the occurrence and development of it. Wudaoliang is 
the hometown of the first author. This made it easier for the research team to approach the 
various stakeholders. 
Due to China’s strong kinship tradition, family is the basic unit of Chinese village 
society (Fei, 1999). Hence, based on family relationships, the residents of Wudaoliang 
formed numerous small groups to interact with the government and developer. Therefore, 
purposive sampling was adopted to find the most representative stakeholders in the process of 
land expropriation and explore the process and internal mechanisms of their interaction. The 
non-participant observation identified 76 families who had formed 34 groups. To obtain 
comprehensive and relevant information, the leaders of each group were selected for in-depth 
interviews, resulting in a sample of 39: 3 township government workers, 34 individuals 
categorised as ‘residents’ (25 ordinary residents of the village, 7 residents who worked in 
other cities and 2 non-residents who lived in other cities but owned real estate in the village) 
and 2 village cadres (1 village party secretary and 1 village director). The content of the 
in-depth interview focuses on the relationships of three stakeholders while adhering to the 
social action theory. The relevant questions based on the perspective of actors (three 
stakeholders), objectives and their specific actions, such as “What do you think about the 
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actions of local governments/residents/developers throughout the land expropriation for 
tourism development?” “What actions have led you to change your view of land 
expropriation, and what actions have you taken to adapt to the changing situation? Why do 
you take these actions, the purpose behind them or what is the meaning to you?” It’s worth 
noting that, these questions are not fixed but will be adjusted at any time according to the 
perspectives of different stakeholders and what they tell, and further in-depth interview 
questions will be generated according to their content. The average interview time was 36 
minutes. The age of the respondents ranged from 17 to 76. The interviews were conducted in 
the interviewees’ mother language Mandarin. All interviews were recorded, transcribed and 
then translated into English by two tourism scholars who were professional in both Mandarin 
and English. After interviews with key figures, the content of the information obtained 
gradually began to repeat, and eventually no new information appeared. The data analysis 
indicated that the information provided by the various stakeholders became stable at the 28th 
informant, and the data provided by the last 11 respondents did not lead to any substantive 
changes to the codebook. Finally, 180 interviews were conducted, and 536 pieces of original 
information were collected from the 39 interviewees. To further ensure the trustworthiness of 
the study, we used the principles suggested by Lincoln and Guba (1985) to assess the 
credibility of the study. The three authors regularly discussed and cross-verified the analysis 
results to ensure the reliability and validity of the results to ensure the accuracy and 
credibility of the results. In terms of peer debriefing, four faculty members at the leading 
authors’ University with research expertise in behavioural psychology and socio-cultural 
studies were asked to act as disinterested peers and debate with the research team on the 
design of the interview protocol and the construction of the codebook to improve the 
credibility and effectiveness of our qualitative study. The raw data were subjected to thematic 
analysis, which is a systematic technique of identifying, analysing and interpreting patterns in 
data and classifying the data into ‘themes’ (Clarke & Braun, 2017). The analysis consisted of 
six stages: becoming familiar with the data, generating initial codes, searching for themes, 
reviewing the themes obtained, defining and naming the themes, and interpreting the 
meanings of the themes (Creswell, 2014). The quotations used in the findings were each 
supplemented by details of the participant’s number, gender and age and the specific time 
(year and month) of the interview. 
6. Findings  
The non-participant observation revealed that two key events in the land expropriation 
process functioned as turning points. The first key event was outlined in two important 
announcements by the Luanping County People’s Government on 16 May 2016: 
‘Announcement on the Land Planning of Wudaoliang Land in Sandaogou Village’ and 
‘Announcement on the Land Expropriation of Wudaoliang in Sandaogou Village’. These 
announcements indicated that an agreement had been reached between the government and 
the developer. The second key event was outlined in the village committee’s announcement 
on 26 July 2017: ‘As approved by the township, the land expropriation agreement for 
residents will be signed between 8:30 a.m. on 26 July 2017 and 4:00 p.m. on 2 August 2017’. 
The signing of the agreement suggested that upon receiving their compensation, residents 
would completely lose their right to use the land. Based on these two key events, the land 
expropriation process can be divided into three stages: 1) before the announcement; 2) after 
the announcement and before the signing of the agreement; and 3) after the signing of the 
agreement. 
6.1. Before the announcement 
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TXJZ was not the first company to express interest in developing tourism in Wudaoliang. 
With the increasing popularity of the local area and the success of nearby tourism projects, 
many investment companies began to pay attention to the tourism development value of 
Wudaoliang. First, senior management personnel from various enterprises conducted 
on-the-spot investigations of the area to determine its potential for tourism. To obtain the 
development and management rights for high-quality investment projects, TXJZ took two 
main actions. First, the company made several rounds of visits to Wudaoliang to assess the 
technical feasibility of tourism development and contacted and negotiated with the county 
government. TXJZ also invited key personnel at the three levels of government to visit 
project sites that had been built in the early stages of the enterprise’s tourism development 
business. By showcasing its past projects, the company demonstrated to the local government 
its willingness and ability to develop tourism in Wudaoliang. The purpose of these measures 
was to create a favourable business atmosphere and secure external support from the local 
government in the future. 
That time it was a Hong Kong company, the tall man was the county party secretary, he 
had to accompany the inspection. It seems that the county was really attached to the project, 
we believed they really planned to implement tourism development here. (Participant 36, 
female, 47, 201604) 
The county government is the highest level of local government responsible for 
decision-making on matters in Wudaoliang. Promoting the economic growth of the village 
and even the county is not only the core goal of the county government, but also an important 
component of its performance evaluation. In the context of China’s existing tax distribution 
system, land transfer has become an important channel for local governments to alleviate the 
pressure of fiscal shortfalls (Zhao & Yang, 2015). Driven by these goals, the core work of 
local governments is to actively negotiate with relevant developers and select the strongest 
and most appropriate. In addition, the government promises to provide preferential policies 
for developers as far as possible. Compared with the county government, the township and 
village governments participated much less in the preliminary investigation of tourism 
development in Wudaoliang. Instead, these two levels of local government were primarily 
responsible for cooperating with the county government on its tourism development 
inspection mission. 
We have had so much land expropriated by the government. The price paid to the 
residents is US$11,765 per acre, then a higher price is paid by the developer. The county can 
make tens of millions of dollars in a short time. That’s why our county has been selling land 
in recent years. (Participant 4, female, 51, 201603) 
The township government does not have the right to decide. It just accompanies [the 
developer and county government] and provides guidance. (Participant 10, female, 44, 
201603) 
The residents of Wudaoliang face difficult living conditions. When they were offered 
compensation for the expropriation of local land, they were convinced that tourism 
development would improve their quality of life. Before any real investment capital had 
entered the region, Wudaoliang’s residents were generally keen to attract investors, and they 
came together every day to exchange news on this possibility. A few far-sighted residents 
implemented a strategic plan. While waiting for capital from investors, they planted saplings 
on their land to ensure that they would receive higher financial compensation (because 
different types of crop receive different levels of compensation under China’s property and 
land management laws). However, local residents were not able to participate in the early 
decision-making process (Table 1). 
[We hoped to] develop our village as soon as possible, so that we old couples could get 
the promised compensation, allowing us to live with our children in Beijing to reduce their 
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financial burden. (Participant 5, female, 67, 201601) 
We [residents] are like big idiots. The government won’t tell you anything until it’s time 
to sign. (Participant 35, male, 41, 201603). 
On 11 April 2016, after several rounds of investigation and negotiation, the Luanping 
county government and TXJZ signed the agreement.  
Table 1 Actors, goals, actions and typical events before the announcement 
Actor Goals Actions Typical events 
Tourism 
developer 
Identify high-quality investors 
Create a supportive business 
environment 
Secure high financial returns 
Field visit 
Negotiations 
Visiting the project site 
Inviting the government to 
inspect existing projects 






Find high-quality tourism 
developers to invest 
Promote local economic 






Formulating preferential policies 
for tourism investment 
Inspecting projects built by 
tourism developers in advance 
Residents Support and cooperate with 
local tourism development 
Obtain employment or the 
return of tourism development 





Gathering for discussion 
Planting cash crops with high 
compensatory value in advance 
6.2. After the announcement and before the signing of the agreement 
The reform of China’s tax distribution system rapidly reduced local governments’ share 
of government revenue. Insufficient local financial funds have become a key bottleneck 
restricting local economic development (Zhao & Yang, 2015). However, local governments 
have largely retained their power. Due to the decentralisation reform, local governments can 
be considered relatively independent subjects of interest (Zhang, 2002). Under the reformed 
tax distribution system, all of the revenue from land transfer is assigned to local governments, 
enabling local governments to increase their revenue. Luanping county government lacked 
the fiscal strength required to achieve land expropriation in Wudaoliang through the usual 
auction procedures. According to China’s land management law, land developers must be 
selected via a bidding, listing and delisting process. Normally, development cannot begin 
until required legal procedures have been undertaken and residents have been made aware of 
the plans. However, to obtain the land development rights as quickly and cheaply as possible, 
after signing the cooperation agreement, TXJZ paid US$2.94 million in advance to Luanping 
county government to facilitate the expropriation of 110 acres of land without going through 
the normal procedures. This advance payment not only relieved the local government’s 
financial pressure, but also expedited the construction process. To communicate and negotiate 
with local residents as effectively as possible, TXJZ also hired some local influential social 
elites to deal with daily affairs. 
In recent years the government has seen too many dodgy developers. These developers 
did not send money, they did not dare to [pay for] land expropriation. If they had to spend a 
lot of money, developers would not buy our land, and the government would suffer huge 
losses. But our county is poor. This money [the land compensation] was TXJZ’s advance 
payment to the county government. (Participant 4, female, 45, 201701) 
When the land expropriation funds were in place, the Luanping county government 
released two announcements to publicise and explained the work procedures, compensation 
standards, incentive policies and prohibited behaviours. This demonstrated a remarkable 
efficiency, as the announcements not only expressed firm support for the developers, but also 
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provided a strong foundation for and guarantee of the smooth promotion of land 
expropriation. Subsequently, under the leadership of the county government, a working group 
formed by the township and village governments began to sign land expropriation agreements 
with residents. In particular, village governments and rural elites employed by TXJZ began to 
play a key role at this stage. Exerting both political power and social influence, they 
persuaded many residents to accept the land expropriation agreement. 
Hurry up and sign the expropriation agreement. Those who sign early get 
[compensation] early. Early signing will be rewarded. The township signed a written pledge 
to fulfil a military order, using all means to ensure that the signing proceeded smoothly. 
(Participant 19, Female, 51, 201609) 
After the announcements, further information on the land expropriation was disclosed. 
For example, the residents were informed that the scope of land expropriation would be 
limited to 110 acres, with standard compensation of only US$11,765 per acre. However, land 
in Wudaoliang was divided into core land and peripheral land. The developer planned to 
expropriate only 110 acres of prime core land. Whereas the residents had previously been 
unanimous in their enthusiasm for the project, their attitudes towards and degree of support 
for tourism development now began to diverge. Some residents planted economically 
valuable saplings on their land on the night of the announcements. Some residents refused to 
move their family tombs out of Wudaoliang for emotional reasons. Some hoped to gain 
favour with the land evaluators. The intrinsic motivation of these actions was to maximise 
their possible economic benefits. However, as the fundamental goal as expressed at that stage 
was to improve quality of life, there was no real opposition to tourism development; for 
example, no opposition groups were formed. Maximising their individual interests by 
enhancing their relationship with the developer was the main behavioural characteristic of 
local residents at this stage (Table 2). 
What standard did the government use to decide on compensation for the land 
expropriated? Why did we [residents] receive so little compensation? As the compensation 
was too low, I was not willing to agree. (Participant 16, male, 42, 201612) 
During the 7 working days from 26 July to 2 August 2017, 76 of the 77 households in 
Wudaoliang village completed the signing of the land expropriation agreement. 
Table 2 Actors, goals, actions and events after the announcement and before the signing 
of the agreement 
Actor Goals Actions Typical events 
Tourism 
developer 
Acquire the formal land 
development right with the 
minimum cost and the fastest 
speed 
Promote project construction 
Obtaining extra 
support from the 
government through 
good relationships  
Pre-payment for expropriation 
of land 
Employment of local elites to 






Realise land expropriation as 
soon as possible 
Promote the implementation 
of the project 
Eliminate ‘interference’ from 
residents s much as possible 
Giving extra support 
to the developer 
through both public 





incentive schemes, and details 
of prohibited behaviours 
Persuading residents to sign 
through family relationships 
Residents Maximise compensation 







Rapidly planting saplings and 
refusing to move tombs to 
obtain higher compensation 
Building relationships with 
land valuers 
6.3. After the signing of the agreement 
11 
 
To increase the efficiency of project operation and management in the third stage, the 
developer and Luanping county government established a plan for the overall demolition of 
buildings and relocating 76 local households as soon as the cooperation agreement had been 
signed. Unlike other destination tourism development procedures, the land expropriation and 
house demolition work undertaken for tourism development in Wudaoliang was divided into 
two steps. Once the basic land expropriation work had been completed, especially the 
disclosure of plans to resettle households elsewhere, resistance to the development process 
began to increase. The government-led demolition of residential buildings progressed slowly. 
The investing companies continued to use local social elites to smooth their interaction with 
residents, but they also began to release information that could directly or indirectly exert 
pressure on the local government. They informed the government of the opportunity costs 
that divestment might bring to the local economy and tried to persuade residents to cooperate 
with the government in accepting the relocation scheme. Individual residents who steadfastly 
refused resettlement schemes were attacked in their own homes by unidentified persons. 
However, these flagrant violations of civilised behaviour and China’s modern legal system 
went unpunished. Unsurprisingly, this placed great psychological pressure on residents, 
reducing their resistance to the demolition of houses. 
The government officials and [representatives of the] developer are really wicked. They 
made BZW drink drive on purpose and took him to the police station. BYF hit a man with his 
car a few years ago and they planned to arrest him as well. None of our family members has 
done anything against the law. We clearly understand that this way of compensation is 
definitely not good. If it does not change, I will petition against it. (Participant 25, female, 55, 
201712) 
If negative publicity about house demolition eventually leads developers to withdraw, 
local governments will face huge default costs. In Wudaoliang, the local government first 
used both control and compromise to encourage residents to accept the resettlement clause 
and sign the house demolition agreement. The local government began to use its public power 
to arrest people who had violated the law or other regulations, especially those who refused to 
accept the resettlement programme. After arresting the residents, the government offered 
them resettlement in exchange for exemption from punishment. At the same time, the local 
government urged civil servants, teachers and other public sector workers to persuade their 
relatives and friends through warnings and ‘exhortations’. They also made residents various 
promises and set different compensation standards in an attempt to meet their specific needs. 
These measures undoubtedly became the key external factors promoting residents’ 
acceptance of the relocation plan. 
It turned out that BCB was just as adamant as we were about not signing the agreement. 
Even through they wanted to take him to the police station, he would not compromise. He and 
his daughter-in-law were both teachers. They were told that if they did not sign, they would 
be transferred to teach in the most remote valley area in Luanping. All of a sudden, the 
agreement was signed. You have no place to air your grievances, and your job is in someone 
else’s hands. (Participant 38, male, 45, 201805) 
At this stage, with the disclosure of more information on the project, such as plans to 
relocate residents and provide zero compensation for peripheral land, Wudaoliang’s residents 
increasingly realised that they would be excluded from the tourism development process. 
They realised that they would not truly share in the dividends of future tourism development. 
As a result, their sense of ownership and awareness of their right to participate in 
decision-making on development began to increase. The village’s residents began to establish 
limited coalitions in opposition to the planned demolition and resettlement. They used formal 
legal means, such as petitions, to advocate for involvement in tourism development 
decision-making and processes. However, the dominant motivation for these rural residents 
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was to improve their livelihoods and gain access to resources, based on the principles of the 
pursuit of safety and risk avoidance. The pursuit of profit was a secondary motivation, after 
the fulfilment of security-related needs (Scott, 1976). However, due to various threats from 
the local government, more and more residents withdrew from the coalitions they had formed. 
These residents finally decided to accept the terms of the resettlement programme (Table 3). 
The government’s decision-making on the location of the resettlement housing was not 
transparent and we were not involved at all! (Participant 22, male, 50, 201803) 
Our resettlement housing was not in Wudaolaing, but somewhere else. The government 
and developers were clearly bullying us; if our house was to be built somewhere else, I was 
not willing to go! (Participant 31, male, 56, 201803) 
Of the 77 households in Wudaoliang, 76 accepted the relocation plan, but the local 
government and developer did not have enough patience to wait until the last household had 
agreed. On 1 May 2018, tourism development in Wudaoliang officially broke ground, and the 
roar of large machines began to echo through the small mountain village. 
Table 3 Actors, goals, actions and events after the signing of the agreement 
Actor Goals Actions Typical events 
Tourism 
developer 
Complete the demolition as 
soon as possible 
Promote project construction 
and settle local residents in 
other places 
Putting pressure on 
the government 




Local residents attacked in 






Complete the house 
demolition agreement as 
soon as possible 
Reassure the local population 





Arrest of residents or their 
close relatives who had 
violated laws and 
regulations 
Sowing division between 
residents through the 
influence of relatives and 
friends 
Residents Participate in the Wudaoliang 
tourism development process  
Obtain higher compensation 




with the help of 
exogenous forces 
Forming interest 
organisations against the 
demolition and relocation  
Forming groups to petition 
provinces and cities 
7. Wudaoliang as a tourism growth machine  
Game-playing processes similar to those associated with urban growth occur in relation 
to land and stakeholders in the process of rural tourism development in China. In terms of 
land expropriation and housing demolition, which are major wealth-related issues, the game 
structure covers the interests of local governments at the county, township and village levels, 
tourism developers and local residents. However, the local political structure formed in the 
process of rural tourism development in China is unbalanced, due to rural residents’ lack of 
social autonomy and capacity for political participation (Ying & Zhou, 2007). Local residents 
are in a very weak position – even in land expropriation and housing demolition affairs that 
involve their own major interests (Wang & Yotsumoto, 2019). Few residents are able to 
engage in effective discourse with the government and developers. In contrast, the 
government’s administrative power makes it both an interest participant and a source of 
political rights in rural economic and social development, as the government has the authority 
to make rules for tourism development. Further, to increase their fiscal revenue, improve their 
political performance and foster local economic growth, local governments are often willing 
to combine their administrative power with the huge capital of developers. Developers also 
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hope to obtain greater returns on project investment, and thus cooperate with local 
governments with rich political resources to secure a more cooperative external environment 
in the search for profits. Therefore, considering the interactive game structure of individual 
subjects of interest in the tourism development growth machine and taking account of 
Chinese characteristics, a ‘rural tourism development growth machine’ composed of ‘political 
elites’ and ‘economic elites’ is formed, which is consistent with the early growth of cities. 
The whole process of rural tourism development is government-led, with the growth coalition 
as its core (Fig. 1). 
County governmentounty govern ent
Township governmento nship govern ent


























Fig. 1. Triadic relationship between stakeholders during the process of land expropriation 
Notes: The solid line indicates the establishment of a coalition relationship between actors. 
The dotted line represents a failed attempt to establish the coalition relationship between 
actors. 
Before the announcements, Wudaoliang’s residents responded positively to the simple 
appeal to participate in tourism development and thereby improve their living conditions. 
Their demands were in line with the goal of the local government and developer, namely to 
promote the implementation of the tourism projects to obtain mutual benefits. As a result, the 
three parties initially supported and cooperated with each other. The interests of the three 
parties in rural tourism development formed a relatively loose structure and a growth 
coalition in the short period before the expropriation of funds was actually implemented. 
With the release of the abovementioned twin announcements, more relevant information was 
disclosed. At this point, local residents became aware that some benefits were not reasonably 
guaranteed. They began to deliberately create obstacles to maximise their individual interests 
through the implementation of the project, and their goals began to diverge from those of the 
government and developer. The local government and developer continued to cooperate in 
guarding against the risk of loss caused by project failure. The two sides eventually formed a 
more solid growth coalition that essentially excluded residents. That is to say, the core role of 
the local government after the release of the two announcements was to promote the 
implementation of development without the interference of local residents. The status of the 
government shifted from that of an intermediary or bridge (before the release of the 
announcements) to that of a service provider for the tourism developer (after the 
announcements). 
The signing of the agreement indicated that residents’ initial demand to participate in the 
tourism development process and improve their living conditions had been completely 
overturned. At this stage, the interests and goals of residents ran completely counter to those 
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of the local government and developer. Some residents began to fight for their interests 
against the local government and developer through procedural justice and legal means. 
Through this struggle, the interests of the local government, the developer and residents each 
became more prominent. Ultimately, this conflict promoted a more stable growth coalition 
between the local government and developer. Generally, in the process of land expropriation 
for rural tourism development in China, based on common economic interests and value 
expectations, local governments and developers gradually form a more and more stable 
growth coalition. Research has shown that when such a growth coalition harms the interests 
of other interest groups, the victimised groups will often form an anti-growth coalition 
(Zhang, 2002), impeding the implementation of the action programme of the growth coalition 
(Molotch, 1976). However, due to differentiated value demands, such as local residents’ 
economic and emotional interests, as well as differences in the willingness to participate in 
and enthusiasm for tourism development, the anti-growth coalition often observed in urban 
research did not form in the process of rural tourism development in Wudaoliang. In reality, 
given the residents’ weak position, the local government and developer had far more 
opportunities to intervene in and sabotage the organisational structures formed by rural 
residents. This was due to both subjective constraints and objective factors. The subjective 
constraints included the diverse interests and demands of individual rural residents (Byrd, 
2007) and their limited ability to participate. The objective factors included the administrative 
and economic support for the alliance centred on the local government. Foreign capital is the 
key driving force for the transformation of China’s traditional rural social structure. Under 
this influence, each subject takes its own interests as its guide for action, producing 
complexly interwoven and interactive relationships between subjects. Foreign capital depends 
on power to play its role. 
8. Implications  
This study offers new insights into the logic and mechanisms of the interaction and 
relationships between stakeholders in the process of land expropriation for rural tourism 
development. The results of this study can be used to evaluate the criteria determining each 
stakeholder’s actions, and provide a useful reference for solving conflict and promoting 
cooperation between stakeholders in sustainable tourism development in the future. 
8.1. Theoretical implications 
This study provides rich theoretical insights by exploring the logic and underlying 
mechanisms of stakeholders’ relationships, interactions and actions in the land expropriation 
stage of rural tourism development. First, its findings enrich research on the roles of tourism 
stakeholders in sustainable rural tourism development, especially in terms of social 
sustainability. Sustainable tourism has become a mainstream issue of concern among both 
tourism scholars and tourism practitioners, calling for embedded analysis of different 
stakeholders (Waligo et al., 2015). However, previous studies have focused on identifying 
stakeholders and calling for cooperation between them, ignoring the interaction and 
relationships between stakeholders in tourism development (Wearing et al., 2010). Yet 
clarifying the specific logic of stakeholders’ interaction and actions and seeking common 
interests are crucial to promote cooperation between stakeholders and guide the sustainable 
development of rural tourism (Lee & Jan, 2019). Different stakeholders in tourism 
development have different interests (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Diverging from previous 
literature, this study describes and evaluates the complicated relationships between different 
stakeholders. The findings of this study contribute to the literature on cooperation between 
stakeholders in the sustainable development of rural tourism. 
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Second, this study offers a pioneering adaptation of the sociologist Max Weber’s 
theoretical explanation of social action from the general social psychology field to studies of 
residents’ involvement in tourism. It develops an ‘actor-goal-action-typical events’ 
framework for analysis of the relationships between different stakeholders in rural tourism 
development. With the help of this analytical framework, the process of interaction between 
different stakeholders is fully deconstructed. The innovative introduction of sociological 
theory to explain the phenomenon of tourism development opens up a new path for future 
research.  
Third, this study adapts growth machine theory to explain the logic and internal 
mechanisms of stakeholders’ interaction in land expropriation for rural tourism development. 
Most studies to date have applied growth machine theory to urban economic development. 
However, growth machine theory offers a useful theoretical context to help tourism 
researchers explain local economic growth and development with reference to political 
coalitions and land use allocation (Canan & Hennessy, 1989; Harrill et al., 2011). Through 
the theory of growth alliances, the vulnerability of tourism coalitions is revealed and the 
dynamic and complex relationships between different stakeholders are presented. The 
essential insights provided by this study thus serve as a cornerstone for future tourism 
coalition research. 
8.2. Practical implications 
The findings of this study have not only theoretical implications, but also implications 
for governments at different levels and the developers of tourism destinations. The study 
provides guidance and a useful point of reference for sustainable tourism development in 
developing countries. 
In the land expropriation stage of rural tourism, introducing a third-party stimulus to 
cultivate the development of an anti-growth alliance and ensure residents’ full participation in 
the tourism development process is fundamental to realising the rights of local people and 
negotiating an appropriate price with the growth coalition. The findings reveal the 
disadvantaged position of local residents in tourism development, especially in developing 
countries. It is widely accepted that sustainable tourism development requires residents to be 
involved in the planning process and to actively support the tourism sector (Nunkoo & 
Ramkissoon, 2012). However, local community groups often have limited access to outside 
resources, limiting their contribution to tourism development and, consequently, their ability 
to take advantage of the benefits of tourism development (Nunkoo, 2017; Sautter & Leisen, 
1999). Although governments and elite stakeholders have a direct and powerful influence on 
tourism development discourse, public interests tend to be marginalised (Dredge, 2010). 
However, residents should be at the centre of destinations’ tourism development (Nunkoo, 
2017). Therefore, local governments should consider enhancing community participation 
(Wang et al., 2010), reducing social conflict and promoting the sustainable development of 
local tourism. 
Local governments and developers should pay more attention to the value demands of 
residents to reduce social conflicts and promote the sustainable development of rural tourism. 
This study shows that tourism development in many rural areas is a power game. There is an 
imbalance of power between interest subjects. Local governments are the dominant players in 
this power game (Wang & Wall, 2007). Due to their authority and economic strength, they 
tend to come out on top in conflicts with local residents (Wang & Yotsumoto, 2019; Yang & 
Zhou, 2007). Local governments and tourism developers form the primary partnership in the 
rural tourism development process due to the power and resources they hold (Li et al., 2016). 
The imbalance of power leads to conflict among stakeholders in tourism development. 
Balancing the power and interests of different stakeholders is vital to enhance the dialogue 
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and cooperation between interest subjects for sustainable tourism (Jamal & Getz, 1995). 
Therefore, the government should play a proper role in the process of tourism development. 
Local governments form a ‘growth coalition’ with tourism developers, which focus on 
achieving economic interests. They must facilitate bottom-up approaches to decision-making 
(Madrigal, 1995). Strengthening residents’ participation in tourism development, formulating 
reasonable rules and systems for tourism development and demolition, and resisting the 
formation of unreasonable growth coalitions have become important tasks for the smooth 
expropriation of land for tourism development, which is vital to the stable and sustainable 
development of rural tourism in the future.  
9. Conclusion and limitations 
Exploring the processes and internal mechanisms of the interaction between different 
stakeholders in rural tourism is a prerequisite for promoting cooperation between 
stakeholders on future sustainable tourism development. Through non-participant observation 
and 180 interviews with 39 respondents, this study delineates these processes and 
mechanisms in the land expropriation for rural tourism development in China.  
Using a novel ‘actor-goal-action-typical events’ analysis framework, this study is the 
first to adapt social action theory to deconstruct the process of interaction between different 
stakeholders in land expropriation for rural tourism development in China. In the context of 
land expropriation for tourism development in rural China, stakeholders’ relationships are not 
merely cooperative or antagonistic; they show a pattern of phased evolution of interwoven 
interests with the occurrence and development of key events. This study also uses growth 
machine theory to reveal the logic and internal mechanisms of the actions and interaction of 
different stakeholders. In contrast with previous studies, this study applies growth machine 
theory in the context of rural tourism, which is different from (and much more precarious 
than) general urban tourism. At the core of the framework is the formation of a growth 
coalition between political elites, as represented by the government, and economic elites, 
represented by the developer. However, local residents in the case setting, Wudaoliang, failed 
to form an anti-growth coalition in the process of rural tourism development.  
This study’s findings offer guidance for the Chinese government and developers on 
pursuing sustainable rural tourism development. To promote social stability, they should pay 
more attention to the interests of residents, who are in a comparatively weak position. 
However, this study also has limitations. First, it focuses solely on the context of land 
expropriation for rural tourism development, which belongs to the pre-tourism development 
stage. With the continuous development of destination tourism, more stakeholders emerge at 
different stages, such as tourists. The interaction and relationships between them take more 
complex forms than examined in this study. In addition, due to the conflict of interests, no 
developers agreed to be interviewed for this study. As the Chinese government considers its 
own interests in tourism development and forms a coalition with developers, government 
officials avoid talking about related issues in interviews. Therefore, most of our interviews 
were conducted with residents. In future research, information could be acquired from 
multiple subjects and different tourism development stages could be examined to more fully 
reveal the interactive game relations of the various subjects of interest.  
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